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INTRODUCTION
Investment treaties have tripled in the twenty-first century
with over 170 countries signing onto bilateral investment treaties
(BITs). Most BITs are made between a developed and a developing
country, whereby a host country promises to protect home country's
foreign direct investment (FDI) in exchange for the prospect of in-
creased capital in the future.1 Hence, BITs tend to reduce the expected
risks to FDI in that they stabilize a host country's existing investment
environment, as well as provide a substitute for weak domestic laws
and institutions that are often ill-equipped to protect FDI.2
FDI, especially in emerging markets3 and developing coun-
tries,4 although attractive to investors, still pose some serious risk to
investors who are still wary as to whether their investments will be
protected from the host government interference or political risk;
whether it will be accorded rights such as fair and equitable treatment;
arbitrary or discriminatory measures impairing investment, expropria-
tion, and the right to submit disputes with the host state to binding
international arbitration (such rights are often well beyond those con-
1. Jeswald W. Salacuse & Nicolas P. Sullivan, Do BITs Really Work?: An Evaluation
of Bilateral Investment Treaties and Their Grand Bargain, 46 HARV. INT'L L.J., 67, 77
(2005).
2. Alec Johnson, Comment, Rethinking Bilateral Investment Treaties in Sub-Saharan
Africa, 59 EMORY L.J., 919, 925 (2010).
3. "The term 'emerging markets' is used to describe a nation's social or business
activity in the process of rapid growth and industrialization. Currently, there are
approximately [forty] emerging markets in the world, with the economies of China and
India being the largest." PAUL OBO IDORNIGIE, INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION AND
EMERGING MARKETS: ISSUES, PROSPECTS, AND CHALLENGES, 24, (2011), available at http:ll
nials-nigeria.org/pub/INVESTMENTTREATYARBITRATION,_ANDEMERGING_
MARKETS_-_ISSUES_,_PROSPECTSANDCHALLENGES BYPROF._PAULOBO_
IDORNIGIE.pdf. "In the 2008 Emerging Economy Report, the Center for Knowledge
Societies defines Emerging Economies as those 'regions of the world that are experiencing
rapid informationalization under conditions of limited or partial industrialization.'" Id at
25. The countries that are considered the top emerging markets include Brazil, Russia,
India and China-or the BRIC nations. Id. at 26. However, in recent years several other
countries have begun to come out as strong contenders for investment and manufacturing.
See id. According to a report published by the Global Intelligence Alliance (GIA), a strategic
market intelligence and advisory group, nations such as South Africa, Vietnam, Argentina
and Turkey will join the list of up and coming markets. Alex Carrera, The New Emerging
Markets, EXAMINER.COM (Apr. 10, 2013), http://www.examiner.comlarticle/the-new-
emerging-markets. The study reveals that these nations will join the line up as countries
that will be "highly sought after by international companies in 2012 to 2017." Id.
4. BITs between developing countries account for about 26 per cent of the total
number of BITs. Mahnaz Malik, South-South Bilateral Investment Treaties: The Same Old
Story?, INT'L INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV. (IV Ann. F. for Developing Country Inv.
Negotiators Background Papers., New Delhi), Oct. 27-29, 2010, at 1, available at http:l!
www.iisd.org/pdf/201 1/dci_2010-south-bits.pdf.
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tained in the host state's domestic law).5 Investors can therefore
minimize the political risk of investing in emerging markets and devel-
oping countries in particular by ensuring that their investments are
covered by bilateral investment treaties. So, foreign investors are in-
creasingly channeling their investments through companies
established in jurisdictions that have ratified a bilateral investment
treaty with the host state in which the investment is made. 6 The criti-
cal question has been how to balance and protect the investment of
foreign nationals vis-a-vis the interest of the host state. Such BITs are
signed between states, which provide that nationals of each state,
when investing in the other state, will be accorded fair and equitable
treatment.7 Under most BITs, investments of nations shall not be na-
tionalized, expropriated or subjected to measure having effect or
equivalent to nationalization or expropriation except for public purpose
and against payment of prompt, adequate and effective compensation.8
The encouragement of economic development of states through
private cross-border investment is the raison d'tre of the International
Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) Convention.9
Indeed under article twenty-five section one, the jurisdiction of ICSID
5. Gabriel Meyer & Matthew Colman, South Africa: Arbitration in Africa, MONDAQ
(Mar. 28, 2007) http://www.mondaq.com/x/47178/Commercial/Arbitration+In+Africa.
6. Id.
7. "Many African governments have made efforts to alleviate these concerns by
entering into bilateral investment treaties, and by adopting arbitration legislation, which
respects party autonomy in accordance with the UNICITRAL Model Law on International
Commercial Arbitration (the Model Law)". Id. The UNCITRAL Model Law was
promulgated as a guide for legislation and has been widely adopted with the notable
exception of the United States and the United Kingdom. Id. Arbitration as in most
countries,
lI]n Africa can be held ad hoc or under an institutional arbitration body. The main
recognized institutional arbitration centers in Africa are the Cairo Regional Centre
for International Commercial Arbitration (CRCICA), the Lagos Regional Centre for
International Commercial Arbitration (LRCICA) and the Arbitration Foundation of
South Africa (AFSA), all of which are recognized in their respective regions of
influence. Id.
8. IDORNIGIE, supra note 3.
9. The International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) was
founded pursuant to the "Washington Convention" on the Settlement of Investment
Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States, 1965. Rep. of the Exec. Dirs. on the
Convention on the Settlement of Inv. Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other
States, Mar. 18, 1965, ISCID/15, at 39 (Apr. 2006), available at https://icsid.worldbank.org/
ICSID/StaticFiles/basicdocen-archive/ICSIDEnglish.pdf. Its purpose is to strengthen the
partnership between countries in the cause of economic development by facilitating the
settlement of disputes between states and foreign investors. Id. The World Bank, which
sponsored the Convention and under whose auspices ICSID operates, believed that its
creation would constitute "a major step towards promoting an atmosphere of mutual
confidence and thus stimulating a larger flow of private international capital into those
countries which wish to attract it." Id. at 40.
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over disputes depends on the existence of such an "investment."10
BITs involving developing countries, including African states usually
provide for the arbitration to be at the ICSID pursuant to the Washing-
ton Convention or the Additional Facility Rules, or ad hoc arbitration
pursuant to the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. Arbitration at the IC-
SID pursuant to the Washington Convention is particularly appealing
because such arbitrations are not subject to the procedural laws of any
state and the awards of such tribunals are enforceable in the over 140
plus states that have ratified the Convention as if they were a final
judgment of the courts of that state, subject to the state's laws of sover-
eign immunity.1"
Even when there is a successful arbitration, that is an arbitra-
tion that has resulted in an award, the award would have to be
enforced and usually in a country other than that where the award was
issued. Many emerging countries, including African countries, 12 have
ratified The New York Convention for the Enforcement of Foreign Ar-
bitral Awards (The New York Convention).13 Arbitral awards are
enforced under the New York Convention. The enforcing court is usu-
ally confronted with two competing values: the respect for
international arbitration award and respect for the judgment of a com-
petent foreign court. However, there are situations whereby such
enforcement would be unworkable, for example, if enforcement would
be denied because it is against the domestic public policy. Should that
have an impact on the BITs?
This article examines the prospects of investment treaties and
challenges faced by emerging markets and developing economies.
Look to see the extent to which these investment treaties protect the
host countries and the fundamental issues relating to the scope and
application of the treaties in the context of arbitration. The paper
therefore also examines investment treaties and Foreign Direct Invest-
ment (FDI), explore the extent that dispute resolution mechanism in
investment treaties may impact an investor's decision to invest in a
10. Convention on the Settlement Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals
of Other States, Mar. 18, 1965, art. 25, ISCID/15, available at https://icsid.worldbank.org/
ICSIDIStaticFiles/basicdoc!CRREnglish-final.pdf What is an "investment" is
sometimes the question that has to be answered first before proceeding to the merits of the
dispute. See Rep. of the Exec. Dirs. on the Convention on the Settlement of Inv. Disputes
Between States and Nationals of Other States, supra note 9, at 44.
11. Meyer & Colman, supra note 5.
12. Id. ("[Including Egypt, Nigeria and South Africa").
13. Article 111 provides that "[elach Contracting State shall recognize arbitral awards
as binding and enforce them in accordance with the rules of procedure of the territory where
the award is relied upon, under the conditions . . . arbitral awards." Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 330 U.N.T.S. 38.
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particular state, examine the role of ICSID in settling investment dis-
putes between States and Nationals of other States.14 One issue that
has often arisen is the extent to which the international law protec-
tions afforded pursuant to the Convention may be utilized in
"ordinary" commercial disputes, just because one party happens to be a
state; whether disputes of significant financial importance to national
states should be decided in a private dispute resolution system such as
ICSID arbitration; whether, and the extent to which, contract claims
could be referred to ICSID in the absence of a contractual clause pro-
viding for ICSID jurisdiction.
For example, to what extent may an investor rely on treaty-
based protections in cases referred to ICSID through a BIT, but arising
from contracts containing exclusive jurisdiction clauses in favor of a
national court? Whether investment treaty arbitration promotes the
rule of law and offers incentives to promote fair and lawful decision-
making in national institutions. Does the availability of treaty arbitra-
tion and the corollary rule of law that emanates indirectly sets the pace
to be followed by national courts? Discuss the impact of investment
treaty arbitration on developing countries and how the playing field
may be leveled for all parties involved. Whilst the doctrine of privacy
may make sense in the traditional setting of arbitration, i.e. where a
dispute is brought between two private parties, the doctrine sits less
easily where one of the parties is a state or state entity. In such arbi-
trations the outcome has a consequence much wider than merely on
the two parties at the hearing. An award against a state generally
means a large payout, which can only ultimately come from the tax-
payers. Likewise, the award may have an impact on the laws, policies
and administrative acts of democratically elected governments.
I. BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES (BIT) AND FOREIGN
DIRECT INVESTMENTS (FDI)
BIT agreements started during the Post -Colonial Era after
World War II when newly independent and economically undeveloped
countries were formed. 15 At that time, GATT was the organization
regulating and protecting international trade, but with no correspond-
14. Since 2000, the demand for ICSID arbitration has grown rapidly as a result of
claims based on bilateral investment treaties (BITs) in which states extend open ended
invitations to investors to settle investment disputes through, inter alia, ICSID arbitration.
Vinson & Elkins, Shai Wade & Mark Beely, ICSID: Recent Trends in Jurisprudence 2005.
15. Joshua Boone, How Developing Countries can Adapt Current Bilateral Investment
Treaties to Provide Benefits to Their Domestic Economies, 1 GLOBAL Bus. L. REV. 187, 188
(2010).
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ing organization dealing with investments. 16 Compounding the issue
was the fact that the U.N. General Assembly declared that each state
has the right to expropriate foreign property.17 Consequently, with the
unpredictability of newly formed economies, the right to expropriate,
and with no protection for investments, developed countries sought to
protect their investment as well as their investors.18 BITs offered the
utmost means for obtaining this protection. A BIT is an investment
treaty made between two sovereigns that safeguards investments
made in the territory of the signatory countries. 19 These treaties offer
investors certain economic rights, including the right to arbitrate
claims, consequently attracting FDI, which in turn brings to a country
infrastructure projects, financing, new jobs and economic stability as a
whole.20 States use these investment treaties as "a means to satisfy
the need to promote and protect foreign investment and with a view to
enhancing the legal framework under which foreign investment
operates."
21
The first BIT was concluded in 1959 between Germany and Pa-
kistan and within seven years, France, Switzerland, the Netherlands,
Italy, Belgium-Luxembourg, Sweden, Denmark, and Norway had es-
tablished BIT programs. 22 While the number of investment treaties
has increased, there has also been a remarkable increase in FDI, which
increased from $200 billion in 1990 to over $1trillion in 2000.23 It is
common for developing countries to sign BITs in order to attract more
foreign direct investment (FDI). BITs have become the most important
international legal mechanism for the encouragement and governance
of FDI.24 In fact, the preambles of thousands of BITs state that the
purpose of BITs is to promote the flow of FDI.25 Whether these trea-
16. Id. at 189.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Susan D. Franck, Foreign Direct Investment, Investment Treaty Arbitration, and
the Rule of Law, 19 GLOBAL Bus. & DEV. L. J., 337, 341 (2007). Multilateral treaties are
similar to bit but involves more than two states, for example, North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA) is a treaty among the United States, Canada and Mexico. See id. at
360.
20. Id. at 338.
21. Id. at 341 (quoting MIRIAN KENE OMALU, NAFTA AND THE ENERGY CHARTER TREATY,
2 n.10 (1999)).
22. Kenneth Vandevelde, A Brief History of International Investment Agreements, 12
U.C. DAVIS J. I'NTL. & POL'Y., 157, 169 (2005).
23. Franck, supra note 19, at 338.
24. Eric Neumayer & Laura Spess, Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Increase Foreign
Direct Investment to Developing Countries?, 3 WORLD DEV., 31, 33 (2005).
25. Id.
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ties indeed do attract more FDI to developing countries is an ongoing
debate. Some scholars suggest that investment treaties do increase
FDI. For example, when considering U.S. BITs, Salacuse and Sullivan
noted that there was a strong indication for the conclusion that BITs
promote FDIs.26 Nonetheless, there was an explosion in the number of
BITs signed in the Global Era of the FDI. This explosion was ex-
plained by the debt crisis in the 1980, where developing countries
needed capital finance development and therefore had no choice other
than to seek BITs with developing countries.27 By the 1990s, BITs
signing became common for developing countries; with over 1,000 be-
ing signed, and by 2008, over 2,600 BITs were in place. 28 Some of the
protections provided by these treaties include:
compensation for expropriation, freedom from unreasonable or dis-
criminatory measures, fair and equitable treatment of investment,
national treatment, promises that investment will receive full pro-
tection and security that is no less favorable than that accorded
under international law, free capital repatriation, sovereign's com-
mitment to honor and uphold the tenets of the treaty and honor the
most favored nation requirements. 29
Likewise, virtually all of these treaties provide ADR provisions
that allow states to bring claims regarding the application or interpre-
tation of treaty provisions. In the same vein, investors can bring
claims against states for treaty violations, referred to as investor-state
Arbitration. 30 These ADR processes are arbitration proceedings gov-
erned primarily by either the International Centre for the Settlement
of investment Dispute (ICSID), the United Nations Centre for Interna-
tional Trade Law (UNCITRAL) or the International Court of
Commerce (ICC), with ICSID being the most widely used arbitration
mechanism in investment treaty enforcement
1
It has been stated that BITs harm developing countries rather
than help because they simply provide "foreign control over domestic
economies by redistributing domestic wealth and power through the
26. Franck, supra note 19, at 352. Salacuse and Sullivan found that "when developing
countries sign investment treaties with Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) countries, FDI is likely to increase." Id.
27. Boone, supra note 15, at 189.
28. LuKE E. PETERSON, HUMAN RIGHTS AND BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES: MAPPING
THE ROLE OF HUMAN RIGHTS LAW WITHIN INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION, 11 (3d ed. 2009).
29. Boone, supra note 15, at 190.
30. See generally Susan D. Franck, The Nature and Enforcement of Investor Rights
Under Investment Treaties: Do Investment Treatment Treaties Have a Bright Future, 12
U.C. DAVIS. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y., 47 (2005).
31. Boone, supra note 15, at 190. "[Olver 30 % of current BITs provid[e] for its use."
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transfer of control over local assets to foreign entities".32 Likewise,
that those BITs really don't promote FDI flows to developing countries
but rather primarily serve the purpose of providing high level of invest-
ment protection and liberalization to unstable markets.33 This foreign
control, although could be beneficial to the developing country,34 does
not necessarily increase domestic capital. That FDI would bring in a
flow of foreign currency into the developing country is not necessarily
the case, as for example, where the FDI acquire existing capital stock
and therefore simply shifting control over existing capital and not
bringing in new capital per se.35 BITs act as a catalyst to remove
money from the developing countries, as provisions in the BIT agree-
ment often allows for the free repatriation of foreign investments. Free
repatriation is a passport for investors to grab their money and run at
the slightest indication of potential, political, social, or economic dis-
tress.36 This of course impacts the host country's monetary status.
BITs do not necessarily promote or increase domestic jobs as often as-
sumed. They may instead create a decrease, for example, where the
FDI brings in highly trained personnel from abroad to fill open posi-
tions, or use them to replace domestic management.3 7 Other reasons
BITs are frowned upon as not helpful to the developing countries or
emerging economies include:
* BITs do not promote or require the transfer of technology to
developing countries, especially as the foreign investor tends
to develop the technology in the home state and then ship to
the domestic country, where it is operated solely by non-do-
mestic employees. 38
* BITs do not stimulate increased production, which is quin-
tessential to the development of a stable, self- sufficient
economy. Productivity is created by capital, natural re-
sources and labor. 39 BITs do not necessarily increase capital
32. Id. (quoting Vandevelde, The Economics of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 41 HARV.
INT'L L.J. 469, 484 (2000) (stating that "Marxist economies have characterized foreign
investment as the decolonization of host states").
33. Boone, supra note 15, at 190-191.
34. Id. at 191. As the developing country can be provided foreign capital, jobs,
technology, increased domestic production, and more developed domestic markets.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 191-192.
38. See Vandevelde, The Economics of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 41 HARV. IN'L
L.J., 469, 482 (2000).
39. Id. at 478-479.
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as they simply change the entity in control or decrease
through repatriation.
40
BITs do not help develop the local market nor increase mar-
ket participation. Since BITs do not ensure that the market
they are liberalizing is functioning properly before it liberal-
izes it. Consequently, it may allow in investment not
suitable for the market thereby blocking any potential de-
velopment. 41 This is so because FDI may provide for low
prices or set specific standards of quality that domestic com-
petitors cannot compete with, and thereby being forced to
close, leaving no local competition.
42
II. INVESTMENT TREATY AND THE ROLE OF ARBITRATION IN FDI
"It is not quite clear whether the expansion of BITs and the
right to arbitrate treaty claims has incentivized foreign investment."
43
However the existence of an investment treaty is an important varia-
ble that may affect decision to invest internationally. 44 Therefore, to
the extent that dispute resolution mechanisms in investment treaties
may impact an investor's decision to invest or determine how a trans-
action is structured, it is worth exploring. 45 Especially given that
countries are targeting effective alternative dispute resolution systems
as a means of promoting foreign investment.
46
"An Investment Treaty is an agreement between two or more
sovereigns that safeguards investment made in the territory of the sig-
natory countries."47 States "promulgate these investment treaties as a
means to satisfy the need to promote and protect foreign investment
and with the mind set of enhancing the legal framework under which
foreign investment operates."48 Given the number of BITs in exis-
tence, there are differences that may arise from each specific
40. Id. at 481.
41. Id. at 490.
42. Id. at 481.
43. Franck, supra note 19, at 339.
44. Id. Other variables influencing investment choices may include the potential
financial risk to the investor, stability of investment environment, availability of
appropriate human capital, access to enforcement procedures, personal and professional
relationships and more.
45. Id. at 340.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 341.
48. Id. (quoting Mirian Kene Omalu, NAFTA and the Energy Charter Treaty 2 n.10
(1999)).
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negotiation process, however there are also discernible trends regard-
ing the rights that states offer.49 The sovereign governments generally
agree to protect investments made by nationals of another country and
to sustain this goal BITs select "specific substantive rights that govern
the host state's treatment of an investment."50
A. Substantive Rights
Generally, a typical investment treaty provides investors with a
combination of up to seven different substantive rights:51
1) The treaty generally provides a guarantee that investors will re-
ceive payment of adequate compensation if their property is
expropriated.
52
2) The treaty generally prohibits the contracting states from hin-
dering the free flow of capital by enacting currency controls.
3) The treaty prohibits the host state from discriminating on the
basis of nationality. That is the host-states cannot treat investors
worse than domestic citizens (national treatment) or other foreign-
ers (most favored nation treatment).53
4) The treaty generally requires the host state to treat investments
fairly and equitably.
5) The treaty generally requires the host-state to provide full pro-
tection and security to investments.
6) The treaty generally requires contracting states to guarantee the
investments will not receive treatment less favorable than the
"minimum standards required by customary international law.
7) Lastly, the treaty would include provisions specifying that con-
tracting states agree to honor commitments that they have given
regarding an investment.
49. Gabriel Egli, Don't Get Bit: Addressing ICSID's Inconsistent Application of Most-
Favored-Nation Clauses to Dispute Resolution Provisions, 34 PEPP. L. REv., 1045, 1055
(2007) (quoting Susan D. Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration:
Privatizing Public International Law Through Inconsistent Decisions, 73 FORDHAM L. REV.
1521, 1530 (2005)).
50. Id.
51. Egli, supra note 49, at 1055-56.
52. Id. at n.17 ("[tihe U.S. Model BIT contains the following language: Neither Party
may expropriate or nationalize a covered investment either directly or indirectly through
measures equivalent to expropriation or nationalization ("expropriation"), except: a) for a
public purpose; (b) in a non-discriminatory manner; (c) on payment of prompt, adequate,
and effective compensation; and (d) in accordance with due process of law and Article
5[Minimum Standard of Treatment](1) through (3)) (quoting 2004 United States Model
Bilateral Investment Treaty art. 6(1)), available at http://www.jurispub.com/cart.php?m=
product detail&p=9251.
53. Egli, supra note 49.
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Adding to these protections, the BIT must specify which inves-
tors and investments would qualify to receive those protections .54 In
sum, investment treaties promise that the host governments will not
subject investors and their investments to inappropriate risk. Interna-
tional rules and enforcement mechanism not subject to the control or
influence of host governments are seen as the simple means to protect
investment and an integral part of investment treaties. 55 Substantive
rights, although an important and great aspect of BITs for investors
and their host governments, the procedural rights are quintessential
as they provide for the mechanism for enforcement of the substantive
rights.
B. Procedural Rights
Hence the real ingenuity of BITs is "the provision of procedural
rights that give investors a mechanism to enforce the substantive
rights directly."56 That is, "investors not only have rights, but they
also have an agreed forum to redress [all] alleged wrongs."57 Prior to
these BITs,
when a government's violation of international law adversely af-
fected an investment, the investor's remedies were limited to (1)
negotiating with the sovereign; (2) suing the sovereign in the Sover-
eigns own courts. . .; (3) asking their home governments to
negotiate diplomatically on its behalf; or (4) lobbying their home
government to advocate a claim on their behalf before the Interna-
tional Court of Justice. 5
8
While some of these options afforded opportunities to resolve disputes,
they were often inadequate in addressing investor's complaints satis-
factorily. Today, however, under investment treaties, sovereigns offer
54. Egli, supra note 49, at 1055-56. Generally the provisions dealing with the scope of
a BIT's application are found at the beginning of the treaty and deal with the following:
"the form of the investment;... the area of the investment's economic activity;... the time
when the investment is made; ... and the investor's connection with the other contracting
state." Egli, supra note 49, at 1056 (quoting Salacuse & Sullivan, supra note 1, at 80).
55. Id.; see Jeswald Salacuse, The Emerging Global Regime for Investment, 51 HARv.
INT'L L.J. 427, 451 (2010) (the principles underlying the investment treaty regime
include" [i] ncreased international investment fosters economic development and
prosperity[;] ... [flavorable conditions in host countries leads to increased investment[;] ...
[that] [ilncreasing the predictability . . .of [the] transactions has the effect of lessening
perceived risk and [consequently promote] investment[;] . . . [that] [e]nforceable
international rules that [restrict] host country governmental actions protect and [thus]
promote investment.").
56. Franck, supra note 19, at 343.
57. Id.
58. Id.
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investors the right to arbitrate directly with them for any treaty viola-
tion, consequently, allowing for investors to initiate the adjudicative
process to redress wrong government conduct. 59 So, these investment
treaties provide a dependable and neutral forum for investors to en-
force the rules of law articulated in a particular treaty.60 Even better,
most of the investment treaties allow investors to have some control
over the method of dispute resolution they may eventually select.61 In-
vestors may litigate or arbitrate their claims on an ad hoc basis under
UNCITRAL Rules or at arbitral institutions such as the International
Chambers of Commerce or Stockholm Chambers of Commerce. How-
ever, the most utilized form of dispute resolution under investment
treaties is to arbitrate before the World Bank's International Centre
for the Settlement of Investment Disputes ("ICSID")62
III. CONTRACT RELATED CLAIMS AND TREATY-BASED ARBITRATION
The contracts between investors and States typically contain
dispute resolution clauses. 63 But in spite of these clauses, there are
claims related to investor-state contracts in international arbitration
59. Id.
60. Id. at 344.
61. Some treaties permit investors either to litigate their BIT claims before national
courts or arbitral tribunals. Many treaties limit the acceptable dispute resolution
mechanism to arbitral tribunals. Nonetheless, parties still have the choice to arbitrate
before various international institutions, such as the ICC, the Stockholm chamber of
Commerce or before an ad hoc arbitral body organized under the UNCITRAL Arbitration
Rules. Franck, supra note 30, at 53-54.
62. Franck, supra note 19, at 344.
63. Some agreements provide for a broad scope and states that they shall apply to "any
dispute between a contracting Party and an investor or other party." See The Promotion
and Protection of Investment, Chile-N.Z., art. 10, Jul. 22, 1999, available at http://www.sice.
oas.org/Investment/BITSbyCountry/BlTs/CHI-NewZealand.pdf (stating "any dispute
between a Contracting Party and an investor of other Contracting Party shall, as far as
possible, be settled amicably through negotiations between the parties to the dispute"). See
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Series on International Investment
Policies for Development, N.Y., Investor-State Dispute Settlement and Impact on Investment
Rulemaking, 26 (Sept. 2007), available at http://unctad.orgen/Docs/iteiia20073-en.pdf .
Other clauses limit the scope of application, for example stating that they shall only apply to
disputes 'concerning an alleged breach of an obligation under the Agreement which causes
loss or damage to the investor or its investment.' Id. This is the example of article fifteen,
section one of the BIT between Japan and the Republic of Korea (2002) which provides that:
[flor purposes of this Article, an investment dispute is a dispute between a
Contracting Party and an investor of the other Contracting Party that has incurred
loss or damage by reason of, or arising out of an alleged breach of any right conferred
by this Agreement with respect to an investment of an investor of that other
Contracting Party.
Agreement for the Liberalisation, Promotion and Protection of Investment, Kor.-Japan, art.
15, Mar. 22, 2002, available at http://unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/korea-japan.pdf.
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that may result following the bilateral investment treaties (BITS). The
determination of the scope of application of the investment treaty
clauses has been greatly debated, with the debate focusing on whether
the jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal under the investment treaty is
"limited to dealing with breaches of substantive provisions of the
agreement or whether the jurisdiction can be extended to deal with
claims arising from breaches of an investment contract."6 4 Generally
these contracts include their own dispute settlement provisions under
the domestic law. Consequently, when investors submit contract
claims to the international arbitral tribunals, respondents often make
an objection to the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal on the basis that
arbitrators have the limited jurisdiction to only address claims related
to the breaches of the agreement. 65 Arbitral tribunals recognize the
fact that a breach of the contract and a breach of the applicable invest-
ment treaty constitute separate causes of actions. 66 This recognition of
the two separate causes of actions does not necessarily mean that the
international tribunal does not have jurisdiction to handle claims re-
sulting under the contract.67 There are different scenarios in which an
arbitral tribunal may deal with a claim on an alleged breach of
contract.
A. Situation in Which Breach of Contract is Equal to a
Breach of the Investment Treaty
A violation of a contract obligation under international law
would encompass the breach of a substantive obligation under the in-
vestment treaty agreement.68 In other words, by breaching a contract
with an investor, the host country breaches obligations characteristi-
cally included in most investment treaty, such as the principle of fair
and equitable treatment, the promise to refrain discriminatory treat-
ment of the investor or arbitrarily expropriating investor property.
69
Consequently, claims have been brought for example, for physical ex-
propriation of farmland by government without immediate, adequate
and effective compensation, 70 violation of fair and equitable treatment
64. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, supra note 63, at 26.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, supra note 63, at 26.
70. Tradex Hellas S.A. v. Republic of Albania, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/9412,
Decision on Jurisdiction, 1 1 (Dec. 24, 1996), 14 ICSID REV.: FOREIGN INVESTMENT L.J. 161
(1999). available at http://www.italaw.com/cases/111O; see Michael Nolan & Edward
60 FLORIDA A&M UNIV. LAW REVIEW Vol. 9:1:47
for lack of openness in regulations dealing with an investor's loan;
71
and discriminatory treatment centered on the government's failure to
stop looting of claimant's property by the military.
72
B. Situation in Which Only a Breach of Contract is Claimed
This situation is where an investor's claim is based only on the
breach of contract under the international investment agreement. Be-
cause many investment dispute treaty settlement clauses provide that
arbitration procedures may apply with regards to "any" or "all" dis-
putes which arise "in connection with" or "arising out" of an
investment, questions as to whether such language offers arbitration
tribunals with jurisdiction to hear a claim based exclusively on an al-
leged breach of contract, but not on a violation of the treaty itself.
73
The jurisprudence in this area has been inconsistent depending on how
broad or limited the language is interpreted to mean. Some tribunals
have concluded that the "any" or to "all" disputes language assumes
jurisdiction over just contractual claims, including when the dispute
goes to the performance of a contract.74 In the case of Salini v. Mo-
rocco,75 article 8 of the investment agreement provided that the
investor-state dispute settlement mechanism applied to "all disputes
or differences" between contracting party and covered investor. The
tribunal viewed that "the terms of [article] 8 are very general, and that
the reference to expropriation and nationalization measures, which are
Baldwin, The Treatment of Contract-Related Claims in Treaty-Based Arbitration, 21
MEALY'S INT'L ARB. REP., June 2006, at 1, available at http://www.milbank.comimages/
content/lIl/1109/0606-Nolan.pdf.
71. Emilio Agustin Maffezini v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/97/
7, Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction, 38 (Jan. 25, 2000), 16 ICSID REV.: FOREIGN
INVESTMENT L.J. 212 (2001), available at http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-
documents/ita0479.pdf.
72. Am. Mfg. & Trading, Inc. v. Democratic Rep. of the Congo, ISCID (W. Bank) Case
No. ARB/93/1, Award (Feb. 10, 1997), 36 I.L.M 1534, 1557 (1997) [English original]; 12 INT'L
ARB. REP., No. 4, at Sec. A (Apr. 1997); 5 ICSID REP. 14 (2002).
73. Investor -State dispute settlement and impact on investment rulemaking at pp.
26-27.
74. Id.
75. Salini Costrutorri S.P.A. v. Kingdom of Morroco, ICISD (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/
00/4, Decision on Jurisdiction, $ 60-61 (July 23, 2001), 42 ILM 609, 623-24 (2003), available
at http://italaw.com/documents/Salini-English.pdf. The tribunal stated:
the Tribunal [indicating] considers that the scope of application regarding the
nature of the disputes is limited as to the persons concerned. In this case where the
State has organized [sic] a sector of activity through a distinct legal entity, be it a
State entity, it does not necessarily follow that the State has accepted a priori that
the jurisdiction offer contained in [a]rticle 8 should bind it with respect to
contractual breaches committed by the entity. Id.
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matters coming under the unilateral will of a State, cannot be inter-
preted to exclude a claim based in contract from the scope of
application of this Article." The tribunal read the investor- state dis-
pute settlement clause as limiting the jurisdiction to all investment
-related disputes between a covered investor and the contracting
party, thereby limiting jurisdiction of the tribunal to contracts in which
the state itself, and not any other state entity was a party.7 6 Another
popular case cited in favor of recognizing the jurisdiction of the arbitral
tribunal over merely contractual claims when the investor state dis-
pute settlement provision was considered sufficiently broad is the case
of Societe Generale de Surveillance S.A. (SGS) v. Philippines.77 In con-
trast to this decision, other arbitral tribunals have held that the broad
wording of the investor-state dispute settlement provision is not suffi-
cient to establish jurisdiction with regard to a merely contractual
claims. 78 In the case of Societe General de Surveillance S.A. v Paki-
stan,79 for example, it was found that the tribunal lacked jurisdiction
with respect to claims based on alleged breaches of contract, that did
not tantamount to breaches of the substantive obligations in the BIT.80
The SGS decisions therefore present two different conclusions as to
whether observance of obligation clauses should be read as consent to
treaty -based arbitral jurisdiction over breach of contract claims.81
The discussion takes another dimension when the investment treaty
agreement includes an "umbrella clause."
C. Umbrella Clauses Within the Investment Treaty Agreement
An umbrella clause is a provision often included in BITs under
which the contracting parties undertake to comply with any obligation
76. Id.
77. ICISD (W. Bank) Case No.ARB/02/6, Decision of the Tribunal on Objections to
Jurisdiction, 131-35 (Jan. 29, 2004), 8 ICSID Rep. 515, 564-67(2005). In this case, the
applicable investment agreement was the BIT between Switzerland and the Philippines,
and the investor-state dispute settlement provision of which applied to "disputes with
respect to investments" was considered as general to allow the submission of all investment
disputes, and that the term "disputes" was not limited to the legal classification of the claim.
Consequently, the tribunal found the term to include a dispute arising from an investment
contract. See id.
78. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, supra note 63, at 28.
79. ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/01/13, Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction. 91
323-24 (Aug. 6, 2003), 18 ICSID REV.: FOREIGN INVESTMENT L.J. 301 (2003), available at
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=show
Doc&docId=DC622_En&caseld=C205.
80. See id. at 323-24.
81. Nolan & Baldwin, supra note 70, at 3.
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they have undertaken under the investments.8 2 The provision is often
framed as follows: "[e]ach Contracting Party shall observe any obliga-
tion it may have entered into with regard to investments of investors of
the other Contracting Party."8 3 Or as "[e]ither Contracting Party shall
constantly guarantee the observance of the commitments it has en-
tered into with respect to the investments of the investor of other
Contracting Party."8 4 In international law, it would be accepted gener-
ally through the effect of an umbrella clause that a breach of a contract
becomes a treaty violation.8 5 Investors have contended in ICISD cases
that an observance of obligation clause is a State's consent to have
claims for breach of contract obligations entertained by treaty-based
arbitration tribunals.8 6 Although the two SGS cases present two dif-
ferent conclusions as to whether the observance of obligation clauses
should be read as consent to treaty-based arbitral jurisdiction over
breach of contract claims, as stated above, some later decisions suggest
that the SGS v. Philippines reasoning is more persuasive. For exam-
ple, in Eureko v. Poland,8 7 the tribunal embraced the view that the
umbrella clause provided jurisdiction over contract claims between the
state and an investor.88 The tribunal held that contractual obligations
fall within the plain meaning of the requirement to observe any obliga-
tions that States has entered into.8 9 This trend of following the SGS v.
Philippines case's reasoning and permitting claims for contractual obli-
gations pursuant to an umbrella clause is not followed by all tribunals.
82. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, supra note 63, at 28.
83. Agreement between the Government of Hong Kong and the government of Japan
for thee promotion and protection of Investment (May 15 1997, Art. 2 (3) available at http://
www.law.hku.hk/ccpl/database/bilateral-querylPage35.html.
84. Jarrod Wong, Umbrella Clauses in Bilateral Investment Treaties: Of Breaches of
Contract, Treaty Violations, and the Divide Between Developing and Developed Countries in
Foreign Investment Disputes, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 135 (2006) (citing Pakistan, ICSID (W.
Bank) Case No. ARB/01/13 at 97-99).
85. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, supra note 63, at 28.
86. Nolan & Baldwin, supra note 70, at 3.
87. Eureko B.V. v. Poland, Partial Award on Liability, T 246 (ad hoc arbitration of Aug.
19, 2005), available at http://www.investmentclaims.com/decisions/Eureko-Poland-Liability
Award.pdf.
88. Contractual arrangements between the investor and the host country were subject
to the jurisdiction of the tribunal pursuant to the application of the umbrella clause
included in the 1992 Bit between the Netherlands and Poland. "The Tribunal stated that
the 'plain meaning-the ordinary meaning-of a provision prescribing that a State "shall
observe any obligation it may entered into' with regard to certain foreign investments is not
obscure." See id.
89. Nolan & Baldwin, supra note 70, at 2.
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For example, in El Paso Energy v. Argentina,90 the tribunal instead
adopted the reasoning of SGS v. Pakistan tribunal. The arbitral tribu-
nal argued that the effects of an umbrella clause were potentially very
extensive that evidence was required to show that those effects were in
fact intended by the contracting parties to the BIT.91 Likewise, in Joy
Mining v. Egypt,92 the tribunal also rejected the view that an umbrella
clause has the ability of transforming any contract claim into a treaty
claim.93 The decisions by some tribunals that allow breaches of con-
tracts to be brought based on observation of obligation clause is said to
conclude that the umbrella clause has the effect of internationalizing
contractual obligations.
94
D. "Fork-in-the Road" Clauses
Some investment treaty agreements include provisions that
prevent the same investment dispute from being addressed in more
than one dispute settlement forum, thereby requiring the host country
to respond to the same claims more than once. Needless to say, this
may result in inconsistent decisions. The possibility that an investor
may present a dispute to the domestic court of the host country and
then concurrently or subsequently submit the same dispute to interna-
tional arbitration is of concern. To avoid this potential outcome, some
agreements require the investor to decide from the very beginning
whether the dispute shall be resolved in domestic tribunal or through
international arbitration. 95 Consequently, once the dispute is submit-
ted to either forum, the choice is definitive. This technique is known in
treaty practice as the "fork-in-the road" provision. An example of such
a provision could read as follows: "[o]nce the investor has submitted
90. ICSID Case No. ARB/03/15, Decision on Jurisdiction, (Apr.27, 2006), 21 ICSID 488,
available at https://icsid.worldbank.org(ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&action
Val=showDoc&docId=DC5 11_En&caseId=C 17.
91. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, supra note 63, at 29.
92. Joy Mining Mach. Ltd. v. Egypt, Award on Jurisdiction, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No.
ARB/03/11 (2004); available at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/joy-mining-award.pdf.
93. See id. The transaction in this case involved bank guarantees that were found by
the tribunal to be simply a contingent liability and not "investments" for the purpose of
Article 25 (1) of the ICISD Convention. So here, unlike in SGS v. Pakistan, the position of
the arbitral tribunal in Joy Mining v. Egypt was not to comment on whether an umbrella
clause would transform a claim based on an investment contract into a treaty, but rather
the tribunal simply considered that in a case where a contract is not an investment, the
investment could not be converted into a covered investment by virtue of an umbrella
clause. See also United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, supra note 63 at
29.
94. Nolan & Baldwin, supra note 70, at 4.
95. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, supra note 63, at 30.
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the dispute to the competent tribunal of the Contracting Party in
whose territory the investment was made or to international arbitra-
tion that election is final."96 Another approach used in international
investment agreement to this issue is known as the "no-U-turn" which
provides the investor with option of making a final decision on the
venue for the dispute at later time, including even after the investor
has submitted the dispute to a tribunal in the host country. 97 So using
this technique would allow the investor to opt for international arbitra-
tion for example, as long as domestic tribunal has not been decided. 98
Both approaches endeavor to avoid the same investment from being
addressed in more than one forum at the same time (lis pendens).99
IV. SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES-ARBITRATION
Once a government has violated a treaty obligation,100 the in-
vestor may get the ball rolling for arbitration by picking one of the
neutral arbitrations listed in the investment treaty and then submit a
Notice and request for arbitration.
A. ICSID-the Role of ICSID in the BIT Regime
The World Bank, as an international institution that gave loans
to its member countries in order to foster production and development,
understandably plays an important role in international investment.
This role is consistent with the World Bank's underpinning, which is to
encourage international investment by private investors.101 No doubt,
in the early days of the BIT movement, the World Bank received re-
quests to assist in the settlement of disputes among member states.10 2
The World Bank attempted to resolve disputes but there were concerns
about the proper role of the bank, and that concern caused the Bank to
96. Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of Chile and the Government
of the Republic of Indonesia on the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments,
Chile-Indon., art. IX 3, April 7, 1999; available at http://www.sice.oas.org/investment/
BITSbycountry/BlTs/CHIIndonesia.pdf.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. This may include for example, the government conduct may involve the enactment
of a law that redenominates local currency, the breach of a government privatization
contract or the failure to provide police protection. Franck, supra note 19, at 344-345.
101. Egli, supra note 49, at 1058 (citing Vincent Orlu Nmehielle, Enforcing Arbitration
Awards Under the International Convention for the Settlement of Investment Disputes
(ICSID Convention), 7 ANN. SURV. INT'L & COMP. L. 21, 23 (2001).
102. Id.
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consider new solutions. 10 3 One of the solutions presented in 1961, ex-
amined the feasibility of creating an arbitration mechanism that could
cater for the needs of both investors and governments. 10 4  Conse-
quently, the final result of the proposal was the birthing in 1966 of
ICSID under the International Convention for the Settlement of In-
vestment Disputes (ICSID Convention). 10 5 Thus on October 14, 1966,
ICISD came into existence as an autonomous international agency
under the auspices of the World Bank.10 6 ICSID's purpose was to "pro-
vide proceedings for conciliation and arbitration of investment disputes
between contracting states and nationals of other contracting
States."10 7 That is, ICISD sought to assure foreign investors that they
would receive protections from any unilateral engagement of a host
country.108 So, the Convention therefore sought to remove major im-
pediments to the free international flows of private investment posed
by non-commercial risks and the absence of specialized international
methods for investment dispute settlement.109 Today, ICSID is consid-
103. David R. Sedlak, Comment, ICSID's Resurgence in International Investment
Arbitration: Can the Moment Hold?, 23 PENN. ST. INT'L L. REV., 147, 160 (2004).
104. Id. at 150-155.
105. Id. at 151.
106. This was "after years of preparatory work by legal experts from Africa, Asia,
Europe, Latin America and the United States, and after approval by the Board of Governors
of the World Bank." Id. It was opened for signature on March 18, 1965 and entered into
force on October 14, 1966. See id. at 168. As evidenced by its large membership,
considerable caseload, and by the numerous references to its arbitration facilities in
investment treaties and laws, ICSID plays an important role in the field of international
investment and economic development. See id. at 152. As of November 2005, the
cumulative number of known claims at ICISD reached 219, compared with only 75 in 2000.
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Latest Development in Investor-
State State Dispute Settlement, IIA Monitor No.4, 1 (2005), available at http://bit.escwa.
org.lb/CMSPages/GetFile.aspx?nodeguid=a7831054-Oed6-4040-8480-4b2c7a16116e. Of the
219 known investment treat claims, 132 have been administered by ICSID, 65 under
UNCITRAL Rule and 22 under other arbitration rules. Id. at 1-2.
107. Egli, supra note 49, at 1059 (quoting Raul Emilio Vinuesa, Bilateral Investment
Treaties and Settlement of Investment Disputes Under ICSID: The Latin American
Experience, NAFTA L. & Bus. REV. Am. 501, 504 (2002)).
108. Nmehielle, supra note 98, at 23. ICSID therefore tended to balance the power
inequity between investors and host countries by providing an international dispute forum.
See Sedlak, supra note 100, at 153.
109. About ISCID, ISCID, https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/ICSID/AboutICSID-
Home.jsp (last visited Oct. 1, 2013). Therefore ICSID as an autonomous international
institution was established under the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes
between States and Nationals of Other States (the ICSID or as it often referred to as the
Washington Convention) with currently 158 signatory States to the ICSID Convention. Of
these, 147 States have also deposited their instruments of ratification, acceptance or
approval of the Convention. Recourse to the ICSID facilities is always subject to the parties'
consent. See generally Background Information on the International Centre for Settlement
and Investment Disputes (ICSID), ICSID (Jan. 20, 2013), https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/
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ered to be the leading international arbitration institution devoted to
investor-State dispute settlement. 110 The ICISD Convention provides
for the creation of an Administrative Council,111 a Secretariat," 2 a
Panel of Arbitrators and a Panel of Conciliators, as the principle or-
gans that play the important role in easing the arbitration process. 113
However, the actual work of hearing disputes and ruling on the merits
is the work of the arbitral panels which is organized under the support
and according to the rules of ICSID.
Taking a closer look at the arbitral process- The arbitral tribu-
nals assembled under ICISD act as international courts. As with court
system, the jurisdiction to hear a dispute is quintessential. Article 25
(1) of the ICISD Conventions deals with Jurisdiction and provides:
The jurisdiction of the Centre shall extend to any legal dispute aris-
ing directly out of an investment, between a Contracting State (or
any constituent subdivision or agency of a Contracting State desig-
nated to the Centre by that State) and a national of another
Contracting State, which the parties to the dispute consent in writ-
ing to submit to the Centre. When the parties have given their
consent, no party may withdraw its consent unilaterally. 114
In view of this section, apparently, once ICISD arbitration is
provided for in a BIT, the consent of states that have signed the ICISD
Convention is automatically presumed. This means therefore that,
once a sovereign state signs a BIT that permits ICISD arbitration, it
may not be able to withdraw thereafter from arbitration with an inves-
tor from the other signatory country.11 5 Consequently, many countries
FrontServlet?requestType=ICSIDDocRH&actionVal=ShowDocument&icsidOverview=true
&language=English.
110. Id.
111. The Administrative Council is composed of one representative from each state that
is a party to the ISCID Convention. Convention on the Settlement Investment Disputes
Between States and Nationals of Other States, supra note 10. Per art. 5 of ICSID, the
president of the World Bank Serves as the chairman of the Council. Id. at art. 5. As the
governing body of ISCID, the Council has many duties including exercising powers
necessary to implement the provisions of the ICSID Convention. Id. at art. 6(1)(a)-(g).
112. As the principal administrative body of the ICSID, the secretariat is for the day- to-
day operations of the Centre. Id. at art. 11. The Secretary-General, the main officer of the
Centre carries out the duty of Registrar as well as has the power to authenticate awards
resulting from the ICSID process. Id. at art. 9.
113. Convention on the Settlement Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals
of Other States, supra note 10, art. 3-16.ICISD arts. 3-16, Mar. 18, 1965, available at http:l!
cil.nus.edu.sgrpil/pdf/1965%20Convention%20on%20the%20Settlement%2of%20
Investment%20Disputes-pdf.pdf
114. Art. 25 (1), March 18, 1965.
115. Egli, supra note 49, at 1061.
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find themselves locked into the ICSID system because of their BITs. 16
In those cases in which governments have failed to abide by their com-
mitments to the investors, governments invariably find themselves
involved in international arbitration proceedings, and in many cases
arbitral tribunals have held them liable to substantial damage awards
to injured investors.
117
Initiating arbitration under ICISD may be done by a state that
is a party to the ICISD Convention or by a national of a state that is a
party to the Convention. The secretary General then registers the re-
quest for arbitration'1 8 and then arbitral tribunal is formed in
accordance with the agreement of the parties. 19 In the absence of an
agreement, the tribunal will be composed of three arbitrators, with
each party selecting one arbitrator and the third (the president of the
Tribunal) is selected by the agreement of the parties.120 However, if the
parties cannot agree on the appointment of arbitrators, the Chairman
of the Administrative Council, after consulting the parties will appoint
the remaining arbitrators.' 2 1 Thereafter, the exact order of the process
depends on the relevant arbitration rules as well as the parties' prefer-
ences.1 22 Normally the parties submit memorials delineating their
case, exchange evidence, submit more written submissions, then de-
bate issues of law and fact during oral hearings. Ultimately, the
tribunal will determine if an award is warranted. 123
116. Id.
117. Salacuse, supra note 55, at 447. An example is the case of CME Czech Republic
B.V. v. Czech Republic, an UNCITRAL arbitration under the Netherlands-Czech Republic
BIT, which resulted in an award and payment of US $355 million to the injured investor in
2003. CME Czech Republic B.V. v. Czech Republic, Final Award, UNCITRAL Arbitration
(Mar. 14, 2003), available at http://italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/itaOl8O.
pdf.
118. Nmehielle, supra note 101, at 28.
119. Id.
120. ICSID art. 37 (2)(b), Mar. 18, 1965 available at http://www.jus.uio.no/lm/icsid.
settlement.of.disputes.between.states.and.nationals.of.other.states.convention.washington.
1965/portrait.letter.pdf.
121. ICISD art. 38, Mar. 18, 1965 available at http://www.jus.uio.no/lmlicsid.settlement.
of.disputes.between.states.and.nationals.of.other.states.convention.washington. 1965/
portrait.letter.pdf.
122. Eric Gottwald, Leveling the Playing Filed: Is it time For a Legal Assistance Center
for Developing Nations in Investment Treaty Arbitration?, 22 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 237, 249
(2007). At the start of the dispute, the tribunal chairman and the parties hold a procedural
meeting where the parties get broad flexibility to determine the format of the proceedings,
including the timing and number of pleadings and whether to do away with oral hearing.
Id.; see also ICISD Convention Regulations and Rules, R 20, Doc. ICISD doc availible at
https://icsid.worldbank.orgIlCSID/StaticFiles/basicdoc/CRREnglish-final.pdf.
123. Id. at 249. "Opportunities to challenge tribunal awards are limited[.] [Tihe
investment treaty arbitration system has no appellate review and . . . [has] very limited
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It is worth noting that most BITs require consultation and a
waiting period, usually six months before submitting a claim to arbi-
tration. That is both parties should initially seek to resolve the dispute
through consultation and negotiation. This is the case with the US-
Rwanda BIT, which provides that "the claimant and the respondent
should initially seek to resolve the dispute through consultation and
negotiation" and requires that "six months have elapsed since the
events giving rise to the claim" before it goes to arbitration. 124
B. Investment Treaty Arbitration, National
Courts and the Rule of law
Investment arbitration has the capacity to fuel domestic sup-
port for the rule of law. The real question is whether investment treaty
arbitration promotes the rule of law and offers incentives to promote
fair and lawful decision making in national institutions. Does the
availability of treaty arbitration and the corollary rule of law that ema-
nates indirectly sets the pace to be followed by national courts? Some
argue that investment treaty arbitration creates an environment that
prevents domestic growth of the rule of law. 125 Some commentators
submit that the existence of international dispute resolution for foreign
investment impedes the development of the rule of law in national
courts because it creates a regime that offers a privilege to foreign in-
vestors and eliminate investment disputes from local courts. 126 In fact,
professor Ginsburg suggest that the "decision to bypass domestic
courts may reduce court's incentives to improve performance by depriv-
ing key actors from a need to invest in institutional improvement." 127
This school of thought is also corroborated by professor Ron Daniels
who advocates that investment treaties have "subverted the evolution
of robust rule of law institutions in the developed world... because for-
eign investors rationally refrain from championing good and
generalized rule of law reforms in developing state, preferring instead
grounds for annulment." Id. (quoting Franck, supra note 49, at 249). Also a party's option
for challenging an award would depend on whether it was rendered under ICISD
Convention or under other set of arbitration rules. See Franck, supra note 49, at 1545-57.
124. UNCTAD, Bilateral Investment Treaty, 1995-2006: Trends in Investment
Rulemaking, q 105, UN Doc. UNTAD/ITT 2006/5 (2007).
125. Franck, supra note 19, at 365.
126. Id. (citing Mark Halle & Luke Eric Peterson, Investment Provisions in Free Trade
Agreement and Investment treaties: Opportunities and Threats for Developing Countries,
UNDP AsIA-PAC. TRADE & INV. INITIATWE, Dec. 2005, available at http://www.snap-undp.
org/elibrary/Publications/InvestmentProvisions.pdf.
127. Tom Ginsburg, International Substitutes for Domestic Institutions: Bilateral
Investment Treaties and Governance, 25 IN'L L. REV. OF L. & ECON. 107, 119 (2005).
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to protect their interests by relying on the BIT rule of law enclave." 128
However, the World Bank suggests that investment treaty arbitration
is not a substitute for local institutions, but instead it can be a source
complimenting domestic institutional reform.129 BITs are said to be
more rather than less effective in promoting higher institutional qual-
ity.130 This is even so where these investment treaties are used to
indicate the desire to involve in institutional reform and to abide by
the rule of law, advancing the opportunity to arbitrate investment
claims might simply create a "race to the top" to decide disputes impar-
tially and justly.131 Promoting the development of the rule of law in
national courts does not only advances local judicial institutions but
also foster confidence in the general process of deciding investment dis-
putes, especially given that national courts may become involved in
investment treaty disputes. 132 There are three ways in which national
courts may be involved in investment treaty disputes: 133 1) Like many
BITs, the BIT agreement may allow investors to bring their claims in
national courts under certain circumstances, so investors may choose
to litigate treaty violations.134 2) National courts tend to provide im-
portant support to the investment arbitration process. Although court's
role is limited in ICISD arbitration proceedings, it the role becomes
vital in enforcing ICISD arbitration awards. 135 The integrity of local
courts that supports the fair resolution of investment disputes is there-
fore quintessential in the general process of resolving treaty
disputes. 136 3) Because Investment treaties do not preclude investors
128. Franck, supra note 19, at 366 (citing Ronald J. Daniels, Defecting on Development:
Bilateral Investment Treaties and the Subversion of the Rule of Law in the Developing
World, draft Mar. 23, 2004, available at http://www3.unisi.it/lawandeconomics/stile2004/
daniels.pdf (stating that a Bit is a stand-alone territory in which foreign investors can be
shielded from the legal and political risks of contracting in the home state and depending on
its institution)).
129. Franck, supra note 19, at 367.
130. Id. (referring to the analysis in Mary Hallward-Driemeier, analysis in Do Bilateral
Investment Treaties Attract Foreign Direct Investment? Only a Bit-and They Could Bite,
(June 2003), 21, available at http://elibrary.worldbank.orgtcontent/workingpaper/10.1596/
1813-9450-3121.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 368.
133. Id.
134. Not all investment treaties adopt a model that allows investors to choose between
court litigation and arbitration. Franck, supra note 19, at 368.
135. Id. "In . .. an ad hoc UNCITRAL arbitration, national courts may play an even
greater role. For example, they might evaluate challenges regarding arbitrator's
impartiality and independence or determine whether the arbitrators awarded damages in a
procedurally incorrect manner." Id. at 369.
136. Id.
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from bringing claims for violations of national law, investors may bring
claims associated to their investment before national courts. So while
investors may bring international law claims to international tribu-
nals, they may concurrently refer domestic disputes to national
courts. 
1 3 7
An example of bringing simultaneous claims is the Occidental v.
Ecuador, where the Republic of Ecuador changed its interpretation
and application of tax law. Occidental, as a result, followed domestic
remedies related to Ecuadorian administrative law before an Ecuado-
rian national court, as well as began arbitration proceedings under the
treaty for the apparent violation of international law.'13 So the poten-
tial role of national courts in settling investment disputes
demonstrates that there is good reason and incentives to develop the
rule of law in national courts and consequently foster the integrity of
the dispute resolution process. 139 In the same vein, this shows that
choosing to arbitrate investment treaty disputes does not mean that
local courts are unable to follow the rule of law and demonstrate im-
partial justice. 140 There is therefore a symbiotic relationship between
domestic courts and treaty arbitration decision-making that promotes
adherence to the rule of law and thus support the integrity of invest-
ment treaty arbitration.
14
C. Most favored-Nation Clauses and Dispute Resolution
MFN treatment has been an important feature of international
trade for centuries. 142 Today MFN clauses have extended into interna-
tional investment policy.' 43 "To provide MFN treatment under
137. Id. at 370.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 372.
141. Id.
142. Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development, Most-Favoured
-Nation Treatment in International Investment Law (Sept. 2004) 3, available at http://
www.oecd.org/daf/inv/internationalinvestmentagreements/33773085.pdf http://www.oecd.
org/daf/inv/internationalinvestmentagreements/33773085.pdf
143. MFN treatment was made one of the essential obligations of commercial policy
under the Havana Charter where members agree "to give due regard to the desirability of
avoiding discrimination as between foreign investors" United Nations Conference on Trade
and Employment, Havana, Cuba, Nov. 21, 1947-Mar. 24, 1948, Final Act and Related
Documents, art. 12, 2(a)(ii), U.N. Doc. E/Conf. 2/78 (Apr., 1948). After the Charter was
unsuccessful, i.e., failed to come into force in 1950, the inclusion of MFN clauses became a
general practice in the many bilateral, regional and multilateral investment related
agreements. See Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment in International Investment Law, OECD
(Sept. 2004),http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/intemationalinvestmentagreements/33773085.pdf.
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investment agreements is generally understood to mean that an Inves-
tor from a party to an agreement, or its investment, would be treated
by the other party 'no less favorably' with respect to a given subject-
matter than an investor from any third country, or its investment." 144
MFN treatment clauses are therefore commonly found in most interna-
tional investment agreements, and any provisions provided for a BIT
will be available to every other country with which the host country
has a BIT with an MFN clause.145 While MFN is a standard of treat-
ment which has been linked by some to the principle of the equality of
States, the prevailing view is that a MFN obligation exists only when a
treaty clause creates it. In the -absence of a treaty obligation (or for that
matter, an MFN obligation under national law), nations retain the pos-
sibility of discriminating between foreign nations in their economic
affairs. 146 So, MFN clauses raise the "level of protection guaranteed by
each BIT completed by a country to the level guaranteed by that coun-
try's most protective BIT"'147 Given that the inclusion of an MFN clause
in a BIT can raise the level of protection to that of the most protective
BIT, it is not uncommon to find investors and host states disagreeing
over the correct scope of any clause. 148 Interpretation of MFN clauses
may lead to inconsistent results depending on whether the interpreta-
tion of the scope of the MFN clause is expansive or narrow.1 49
For example, a broad interpretation was used in the Maffezini
v. Kingdom of Spain case. 150 The investors here tried to avoid specific
language within a BIT that mandated a waiting period to expire before
a case could be submitted to ICSID arbitration. Contending that the
MFN clause be interpreted broadly, the investors asserted that they
too be allowed to select individual BIT provisions offered in other BITs.
That is, the investors contended that the MFN clause in the BIT ap-
plied to their dispute and so allowed them to the procedure that was in
144. Id. at 2.
145. Stephen Fietta, Most Favored Nation Treatment and Dispute Resolution Under
Bilateral Investment Treaties: A Turning Point? 8 I'NTL Arb. L. rev. 131, 131 (2005).
146. Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment in International Investment Law, supra note
143, at 3.
147. Federico Godoy, Bilateral investment treaties: Most favored-Nation treatment
Godoy, Bilateral investment treaties: Most favored-Nation treatment 1-2 (2002).
148. Egli, supra note 49, at 1065.
149. MFN clause arbitration canbe divided into two depending on the interpretation
given: 1) expansive interpretations of the scope of MFN clauses and 2) the narrow
interpretations of the scope of MFN clauses. See id. at 1066.
150. Maffezini v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7, Decision of the Tribunal
on Objections to Jurisdiction (Jan. 25, 2000), 5 ICSID Rep. 85, 102, available at http://www.
italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ta0479.pdf.
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one of the host state's other BITs.' 5 ' The Tribunal concluded that dis-
pute resolutions provisions are "inextricably related" to the
substantive rights granted under Bits. That is the tribunal asserted
that given the main objective of a BIT to protect investors from the
random and discriminatory practices of host states, "it would be illogi-
cal to exclude from the scope of such protection the field of procedural
justice. 15 2 Unfortunately, ICISD arbitral tribunals have failed to pre-
sent a unified approach in dealing with the appropriate effect of MFN
clauses on dispute settlement provisions. 15 3 This inconsistent ISCID
tribunal decisions concerning very much the same issues in different
cases 15 4 demonstrates a marked lack of coherence, raising a legitimate
crisis for the tribunal. 155 Likewise this different approach to and inter-
pretation of the scope of the FMN clause foster a loss of certainty
regarding the meaning and application of FMN clauses.156 More impor-
tantly, the effect of legitimacy and certainty may result in the
increased number of challenges to ICISD tribunal decisions. 157 Three
approaches have been suggested for limiting the effect of inconsistent
MFN clause decisions.158 1) annulment of inconsistent decisions-the
ICISD convention provides an independent control mechanism, which
precludes domestic courts from reviewing ICISD tribunal decisions.
15 9
This control mechanism is reflected in Art 52 of ICISD Convention,
which allows for the annulment of awards in a very limited number of
situations. 160 This annulment proceeding does not however permit re-
view of the legal merits of a decision, but rather provides an ad hoc
committee of three arbitrators to examine the procedural appropriate-
151. Id.
152. Egli, supra note 49, at 1068 (quoting KATIA SCHOLZ, HAVING YOUR PIE. . .AND
EATING IT WITH ONE CHOPSTICK - MOST FAVORED NATION CLAUSES AND PROCEDURAL RIGHTS
3 (2004).
153. Johnson, supra note 2, at 1079.
154. See Siemens A.G. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8 (Aug. 3, 2004),
available at http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0788.pdf; Salini
Construction S.P.A. and Italstrade S.P.A. v Has available at https://icsid.worldbank.org/
ICSIDfFrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=ShowDoc&docld=DC634&caseld=
C218.
155. Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.; Maffezini v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No.
ARB/97/7, Decision of the Tribunal on Objections to Jurisdiction (Jan. 25, 2000), 5 ICSID
Rep. 85, 102, available at http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0479.
pdf.
156. Maffezini v. Kingdom of Spain, 5 ICSID Rep. at 3.
157. Id. at 1080.
158. See Egli, supra note 49, at 1081-82.
159. Id. at 1081.
160. See art 52 (1) of the International Convention for the Settlement of investment
Disputes, Mar. 18, 1965.
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ness of the award.161 Therefore, the annulment mechanism is
undoubtedly a useful feature offered by ICISD, but is not an effective
tool for review of inconsistent decisions for errors of substantive law
thus inadequate as a forum for solving the inconsistencies concerning
MFN clauses. 162 2) Amending the ICISD Convention. That is clearly
drafting a provision that would either expressly ratify or reject the ap-
plication of MFN clauses to dispute resolution provisions, where the
parties have not expressed so.' 63 However, such an amendment would
be unfeasible given the increasing number of contracting states, and
the wording of ICISD Art. 66 (1) providing "each amendment shall
enter into force 30 days after... all Contracting States have ratified,
accepted or approved the amendment. 164 3) The creation of an Invest-
ment Arbitration Appellate Court to address the inconsistent decisions
of tribunals. The goal of this purported body would be the harmoniza-
tion of decisions regarding disputed legal interpretations.
165
The widespread of MFN clauses means that signing for example
a US-BIT should attract FDI from other countries. 66 A US-BIT has
heightened standards through MFN clauses. 67 The BIT between the
US and Rwanda, for example, provide foreign investors extensive
rights, such as the right to quick compensation for direct or indirect
"measures equivalent to expropriation or nationalization."1 68 Likewise,
the US Rwanda BIT also sets high standards for treatment of FDI,
assuring that investments will be granted "fair and equitable treat-
ment and full protection and security," "non- discriminatory
treatment"' 69, "national treatment"'7 0 and most favored nation" treat-
ment.' 71 So, foreign investors from countries that have agreed to less
161. Art 52 (3) of the International Convention for the Settlement of Investment
Disputes, Mar. 1965 available at http://www.jus.uio.no/lm/icsid.settlement.of.disputes.
between.states.and.nationals.of.other.states.convention.washington. 1965/portrait.letter.
pdf. The three arbitrators are appointed by ICISD and if the committee finds any of the
listed defects, it may annul the award completely or partially.
162. Egli, supra note 49, at 1081 (citing Franck, supra note 49, at 1547-48).
163. That is, unless otherwise provided by the parties, no MFN clauses should apply to
the express dispute settlement provisions contained in the investment treaty. Id. at 1082.
164. Id. at 1082.
165. Egli, supra note 49, at 1082.
166. Johnson, supra note 2, at 934.
167. Id.
168. Treaty Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment,
US-Rwanda, art .6, Feb. 19, 2008, S Treaty Doc. 110-23 (2008).
169. Id. art. 5.
170. Id. art. 3.
171. Id. art. 4. See generally Johnson, supra note 2, at 933.
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protective BITs with host countries would certainly benefit from a U.S.
BIT's heightened standard via MFN clauses. 172
D. Impact of Investment Treaty Arbitration on Developing Countries
Developed nations sign investment treaties largely to protect
their investment and nationals abroad, while developing countries
tend to sign investment treaties in an effort to promote FDI. 173 So,
BITs reduce the expected risks to FDI in two ways: First, they stabilize
a host country's existing environment and secondly, they provide forti-
fication for weak domestic laws and institutions that are usually ill-
equipped to protect FDI. 174 By signing a BIT developing countries, as
capital importers bear most of the risk investor litigation that is intrin-
sic in signing a BIT175 so when deciding whether to sign a BIT,
developing countries should weigh the potential benefits of increased
FDI against increased exposure to litigation from investors. 176 Two
thirds of the 219 known investment treaty claims filed is against devel-
oping countries government.1 77 In 2005, 37 different developing
nations are said to have been defendants in investment treaty arbitra-
tion, with many facing multiple claims. 78 Developing nations'
experience with investment treaty arbitration is mostly as defend-
ants.1 79 Developing countries face a plethora of challenges with
investment treaty arbitration claims, including the cost of litigation,
possibility of a sizable award, limitations on its freedom to implement
government policies considered inconsistent with treaty obligations. 80
For example, the Czech Republic was ordered to pay $270 million plus
interest to a Dutch based broadcasting firm when the tribunal found
that the media regulatory authorities had breached the terms of the
Netherlands-Czech Republic BIT.181 In the same vein, an ICSID tribu-
nal awarded a U.S. energy company $133 million in 2005 after finding
172. Salcuse & Sullivan, supra note 1, at 107.
173. Mary Hallward-Driemeier, do Bilateral Investment treaties Attract Fdi-
174. Johnson, supra note 2, at 920.
175. Gottwald, supra note 119, at 244.
176. See id. (quoting Unclad, Bilateral Investment Treaty in the Mid-1990 at 3, UN).
177. UNCTAD, Latest Development in investor -state, at 9-10.
178. Id.
179. Gottwald, supra note 119, at 250.
180. Id.
181. See id. (citing CME Czech Rep. B,V, (Neth) v. Czech Rep., Final Award, T 649
(UNCITRAL Arb. Proceedings, Mar. 14, 2003)).
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Argentina in violation of the Argentina-U.S. BIT.18 2 The investor law
suits impacts developing nation's freedom to regulate in the public in-
terest.18 3 In a number of cases, foreign investors that provided water
and sewage in developing countries have filed investment treaty
claims with state and local authorities.
184
As the number of investor claims seems to be growing, there are
concerns over how well- equipped developing nations are to deal with
the challenges of litigating these claims.18 5 Foreign investors who initi-
ate investment claims tend to hire impressive international law firms
with specialty in investment treaty arbitration. That is the developed
nations are more likely to have the resources and legal expertise to
ably defend them. On other hand, developing nations do not have the
same resources and may be forced to hire outside counsel to defend
investment treaty claims.18 6 Evidently, the cost of treaty arbitration is
very high and beyond the means of many developing country, let alone
Less Developed Countries (LDCs).
18 7
182. See CMS Gas Transmission Company v. The Argentine Rep., ICSID Case No. ARB/
01/8, Award (May 12, 2005), at 136, available at https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/
FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docld=DC504_En&caseld=C4.
183. Gottwald, supra note 119, at 251.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id. The cost of the Czech Republic to defend two of its investment treaty claims
related to the regulation of it media sector was about 10 million. Gottwald, supra note 119,
at 251. However, over the years developing nations are building expertise in defending
against investment treaty arbitrations. For example, Argentina defended many claims filed
against them without using outside council, but rather used substantial expertise that was
built for the purpose of defending arbitration treaty claims. However, building such
expertise is time consuming and challenging, especially given that it may require the
diversion of resources from other prioritized legal matters. Id. at 255. Likewise,
developing country council seeking to find relevant precedent on arbitration treaty claims,
may be faced with the challenge of finding incomplete sources for prior arbitral awards.
Access to arbitral case law which is important in the field of public international investment
law is paramount, yet there are fairly a low number of decided cases. This is compounded
by the lack of public knowledge that an investment treaty dispute exists. Of the key
arbitral for a, only ICISD uphold a public registry of claims. See List of Pending Cases,
ICSID, https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=GenCaseDtsRH&
actionVal=ListPending (last visited Sept. 29, 2013). In some cases even when the existence
of a claim is made public, the tribunal award may not be published. Generally, the
investment treaty arbitration for a may only publish awards with the consent of both
parties-ICISD Convention, art. 48 (5) available at https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/Static
Files/basicdocdCRREnglish-final.pdf. Some awards remain unpublished although
informally known and traded by law firms and arbitrators in the field. This asymmetry of
information gives arbitration insiders and practitioners within this network the unfair
advantage of having access to an array of authority to fight and win cases, whereas those
without the resources to hire a major international firm are deprived of the authority to
defend against investor claims. This deprivation invariably creates an unfair competitive
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Looking at some investment treaty arbitration cases from developing
countries to see the difficulties developing nations may face locating
necessary precedent or just basic forms of legal authority would be
helpful in corroborating the analysis.
1. The Seychelles Experience: CDC v. Seychelles l88
From the onset, it is worth pointing out that the investor claim
against Seychelles was based on a contract ICISD arbitration clause
and not on a bilateral investment treaty.18 9 The Commonwealth Devel-
opment Corporation (CDC), a UK-owned development finance
company filed a request for arbitration with ICISD against the Repub-
lic of the Seychelles. The request alleged that the Republic of
Seychelles failed to honor two loan guarantees it had given as security
for a loan to its public Utility Corporation (PUC) to purchase electric
generators. Both loan guarantees provided that any potential dispute
from the contract will be settled according to the UK law. 190A team of
lawyers from a major international law firm based in London with spe-
cialty practice in investor-state arbitration represented CDC. 191 On
the other hand the Republic which has never been sued by a foreign
investor ever, was represented solely by its Attorney General, who had
no prior experience litigating ISCISD or other claims and was a civil
law lawyer. 192 This inexperience in the investor claim was compounded
by limited internet access, the lack of access to Lexis-Nexis and trea-
tises on ICISD. 193 Consequently, the Attorney General defended the
Republic with a copy of the ISCID Convention and Rules and an out-
dated law treatises.' 9 4
The tribunal found the Seychelles had no valid defense to CDC's
default claim under UK law; that the Seychelles counter-memorial did
advantage for wealthier nations. See Gottwald, supra note 119, 257; and also BITs and
Development, Policy Making at 26, 2004, http:/lwww.iisd.org/pdf/2004/trade-bits.pdf.
188. ICISD Case No. ARB/02/14, Annulment Proceeding, (June 29, 2005), available at
http://italaw.com/documents/CDCSeychellesAnnulmentDecision.pdf.
189. This does not necessary change the outcome in that the Seychelles encountered
problems in finding legal expertise and authority. See CDC Group PLC v. Rep. of the
Seychelles, ICISD Case No. ARB/02/14, Award, 3-6. (Dec. 17, 2003), available at http:ll
www.transnational-dispute-management.com/article.asp?key=295.
190. Id. at 7-9.
191. Id. at 1; Gottwald, supra note 119, at 261.
192. Gottwald, supra note 119, at 261. The Attorney General's daily work typically
involves criminal, constitutional and administrative law. Id. at 262.
193. Id. at 261.
194. Id. at 262.
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not comply with the tribunal directions and that its principal defenses
relied on a long overruled English contract law.
195
2. The case of Argentina
Argentina faced a similar problem of lack of legal access in de-
fending investor claims in 2003, when facing an imminent default on
its humongous foreign debt, it passed emergency economic legislation,
that ended parity between the US dollar and Argentina pesos; con-
verted dollar deposits and loans to pesos, and took off the right of
public utilities to hike rates in dollars. 196 As a result of these actions,
massive losses occurred to foreign investors who were in possession of
the majority of Argentina's public debt as well as owned many of the
utilities companies.19 7 Numerous law suits were brought by transna-
tional corporations against Argentina claiming violations of BITs. 198
By the end of December 2004, Argentina was a defendant in over
thirty-seven pending investor-state arbitration claims, with over
thirty-two of them filed at the ICISD. 199 Defending the claims was a
challenge, given insufficient access to legal and human resources.200
The fairness of investor-state arbitration and the knowledge of
the constraints that particular treaty provisions place on the exercise
of sovereignty by national governments has been questioned. 20 ' This
challenge of investor-state arbitration as a regime decision making
process is on the following grounds: that the process is not transparent;
it fails to account for the disparity in economic terms of regime mem-
bers; that arbitrators are not indeed independent and tend to have an
investor bias; that participation in the arbitral process is very costly for
developing countries and that arbitration decisions overstep on the
195. Id.
196. Gottwald, supra note 119, at 263 (citing South Centre, Will investment Rules
Shrink Policy Space for Sustainable Development? Evidence from the Electricity Sector, 17-
19 (2003), available at http://www.econbiz.de/en/searchldetailed-view/doc/all/will-
investment-rues-shrink-policy-space-for-sustainable-deveopment-evidence-from-the-
electricity-sector-cho-albert/10003381958/?nocache=1).
197. South Centre, supra note 193, at 16-17.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Although three years later and with the experience of litigating several ICISD
cases, Argentina Solicitor General Office looked like an investor-state arbitration practice
as one would find in any major international law firm. Gottwald, supra note 119, at 264.
201. Salacuse, supra note 55, at 469 (citing KONRAD VON MOLTKE, A MODEL
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENT FOR THE PROMOTION OF SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT (2004) (requesting for the adoption of a new BIT that would better take into
consideration the interests of developing countries).
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rightful exercise of sovereignty by the host countries. 20 2 Because of
these reasons, Bolivia in 2007 and Ecuador in 2010 officially withdrew
from ICISD. 20 3 In the same vein, Venezuela terminated its BIT with
the Netherlands, 20 4 while Bolivia declared its intent to renegotiate its
BITs. So in all, governments pay the price for treaty provisions that
tends to limit their flexibility in enacting laws and regulations in the
public interest, if that would negatively affect investors. The with-
drawing of Ecuador, Bolivia and Venezuela from the international
regime raises questions as to whether their initiatives are the start of
an effort to change or even dismantle the regime or whether it is only a
deviation with no impact on investment regime. 205 This is a legitimate
question especially given that a withdrawing nation may suffer ad-
verse consequences given the very purpose of an investment treaty is
to reduce political risk to investors, so withdrawing as such may send a
negative signal that may result in an avoidance of foreign capital or
technology to that country. So withdrawal from a country only in-
creases the perceived political risk and a boycott of foreign
investment.20 6 Waiting till the expiration of an investment treaty is
generally advisable. Investment treaties generally provide that they
shall be in force for ten or fifteen years. 20 7 Upon the expiration of the
period, the treaty may continue for an additional fixed period or as en-
ded by one of the parties. 208
E. Recognition and Enforcement of Awards
The value of any arbitration really depends on whether the win-
ning party can enforce its claim against the losing party. To this effect,
Art. 54 (1) of the ICISD Convention provides that:20 9 "Each Con-
202. Id.
203. Bolivia Submits a Notice under Art. 71 of the ICISD Convention, ICISD News
Release (ICISD Washington D.C.), May 16, 2007 available at http://www.1w.com/upload/
pubContent/_pdffpub1939_l.pdf.
204. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Recent Developments in
International Investment Agreements, HA Monitor No.2, 6 (2008), available at http:l/
unctad.orgen/Docs/webdiaeia2008l-en.pdf.
205. Salacuse, supra note 55, at 471.
206. Id.
207. See agreement on Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment
between the State of Eritrea and the kingdom of the Netherlands, Eri-Neth, art 13, April 14
2004.
208. Id. at 472. See agreement between the Government of the Republic of Indonesia
and the Government of the People's Democratic Republic of Algeria Concerning the
promotion and Protection of Investments, Indon-Alg., art. 13, Mar. 21, 2000.
209. International convention for the Settlement of Investment Disputes art. 54 (1)
March 18, 1965.
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tracting State shall recognize an award rendered pursuant to this
Convention as binding and enforce the pecuniary obligations imposed
by that award within its territories as if it were a final judgment of a
court in that State." A Contracting State with a federal constitution
may enforce such an award in or through its federal courts and may
provide that such courts shall treat the award as if it were a final judg-
ment of the courts of a constituent state. Although the ICISD
Convention thus provides for the recognition of awards, and which is
the norm, Art. 55 seem to encroach on that norm as the language of
that section allows for an excuse in favor of a state party to a dispute
by stating that "Nothing in Article 54 shall be construed as derogating
from the law in force in any Contracting State relating to immunity of
the State or any foreign State from execution."210 This could become an
issue when a State's domestic law prevents execution of award because
of its provisions affording sovereign immunity.211 This is compounded
by the fact that the ICISD Convention does not vary or surpass the
rules of immunity from execution against a state which fails to comply
with an ICISD award. 21 2 However, both the New York Convention on
the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards and the
ICISD Convention have tried and tested mechanisms to enforce arbi-
tral awards.
CONCLUSION
I believe leveling the playing field for developing and emerging
markets is quintessential for investment treaty arbitration. Develop-
ing countries and emerging markets, unequal access to legal authority,
expertise and resources undermines the legitimacy of investment
treaty arbitration process. 21 3 So while investment treaty arbitration
has grown, its validity is undermined by reports from developing na-
tions of a lack of affordable access to legal authority and expertise
needed to defend investor claims. 214 The suggestion that a Legal As-
sistance Center for developing nations in investment treaty arbitration
be created is a plausible solution. Such a Center would reinforce and
strengthen the legitimacy of the investment treaty arbitration process
by warrantying that developing countries have affordable access to le-
210. Id. art 55.
211. Egli, supra note 49, at 1063.
212. Id.
213. Gottwald, supra note 119, at 240.
214. Id. at 274.
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gal information and expertise. 215 This would simply promote fairness
and an efficient and effective arbitration process. 216
The paper has also shown that BITs can promote legal spillover
by encouraging a symbiotic relationship between BIT and local court
litigation 217 open transparency provisions that ease foreign investor in-
volvement in the lawmaking process build pressure on host
government to enact laws and institute legal reforms designed to solid-
ify its commercial law. 218 In the same vein, BITs that requires
investors to seek local relief offer local courts with the chance to enun-
ciate and develop principles of domestic commercial law. Thus these
local courts could eventually become capable of effectively adjudicating
complex investment claims and thus be able to compete with interna-
tional arbitral bodies for the business of resolving commercial
disputes.21
9
Developing countries have also made known their interest in
avoiding overly restrictive BITs provisions. This is evidenced by the
increased number of BITs renegotiated due to changed circum-
stances. 220 Renegotiations are expected to be on the rise as countries
revise their model BITs to reveal the growing international acknowl-
edgment that BITs should consider legitimate host-country
interests. 22' BITs end up imposing policies that are insufficient for
some countries and impracticable for others. Countries are asking
whether traditional BITs with broad investor protection clauses that
diminish host countries freedom to regulate in the public interest is
appropriate. 222 In the wake of global financial crisis, there is a growing
recognition that host countries should be allowed a degree of control
over the kinds of FDI they allow within their borders. 223 BITs that pro-
vides for intermittent revaluations of a host country's circumstances
215. Id. at 265.
216. Id.
217. Johnson, supra note 2, at 959.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Karl Sauvand & Lisa Sachs, The Effect of Treaties on Foreign Direct Investments:
Bilateral Investment Treaties, Double Taxation Treaties, and Investment Flows, Oxford
University Press (2009).
221. Malik, supra note 4; 2009 UNCTAD World Investment Report: Transnational
Corporations, Agricultural production and Development, 45 UN. Doc UNCTAD/wir/2009 at
32.
222. In 2007, twenty three percent of all new BITs were the product of renegotiations.
See Malik, supra note 4., SCTR & Morrocan Dept. of Inv., recent Development s in Regional
and Bilateral Investment Treaties 10-12 (2008) available at httpJ/www.iisd.org/pdf/2008/
dcirecentdev.pdf.
223. Johnson, supra note 2, at 963.
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and allows corresponding amendments of its terms would be helpful in
promoting sustainable economic development.
'224
224. Id. at 960. "Norway's proposed model BIT for example, establishes a joint
committee with [the power] to 'discuss issues related to corporate social responsibility ...
the goal of sustainable development, anticorruption, employment and human rights, and...
consider any other matter that may affect the operation of this Agreement."' Id.

